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RANSOMWARE - A STRATEGIC THREAT TO ORGANIZATIONS 1
JAMES FROST
IDAHO STATE UNIVERSITY

ALAN HAMLIN
SOUTHERN UTAH UNIVERSITY
ABSTRACT

Ransomware is a strategic threat to government, business, and academic organizations. It
has both short term and long term consequences, requiring strategic planning to create defenses,
assess options, and create policies.
The purpose of the study is to answer three questions: What is the strategic risk of
cyberattack to organizations? What are the current attitudes and practices of executives who are
vulnerable to such threats? What are specific options that organizations should consider to prevent
and deal with possible incidents in the future? The article is thus comprised of the following
components: A) a history of the development and complexity of ransomware; B) a survey of IT
professionals in government, business and education; and C) recommended strategic options for
organizations to defend against cyber threats.
We conducted a survey of ninety-two cybersecurity professionals in government,
education, and business.
Attitudinal divergence occurred in the areas of cyber-defense,
perpetrator negotiations, ransom payment, and involvement of law enforcement. The authors
recommend thirteen specific solutions to assist organizations when dealing with ransomware.
Keywords: ransomware, cyber security, cyber strategy, password protection, data breach
INTRODUCTION
In a 2015 discussion, Cheri F. McGuire of Symantec identified a series of vulnerabilities
that would rapidly expand. They included data breaches, mobile and social environments,
ransomware, cyber-espionage, and the “Internet of Things” (McGuire 2015). These observations
paralleled a study by IBM Security that found that attackers focused on “inflicting physical
damage, stealing intellectual property and lodging political protests” (Security 2016). The primary
effects are still cybercrime and hacktivism. This paper deals with cybercrime as a rapidly growing
threat fueled by ransomware (as a part of advanced persistent threats – APT) that have expanded
greatly since the year 2000. The problem is so serious that, in certain vulnerable industries, “over
70% of companies hit by ransomware attacks are out of business within six months (Kon 2017),
while those which survive can lose millions of dollars (Fitzpatrick and Griffin 2016).
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
Significance of the Problem
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On April 25, 2020, ATM maker Diebold Nixdorf discovered a ransomware attack on its
IT systems. The company was one of many government and private organizations that were hit
by ProLock, a ransomware related to PwndLocker that demanded ransoms between $175,000 and
$660,000 each (Kovacs 2020). Fortunately Diebold was able to quickly restore service and inform
law enforcement. Others are not so lucky.
Ransomware is not a new threat. Justin Pope provided a historic link to what was probably
the first occurrence. “The first ransomware virus was disseminated almost 30 years ago when Dr.
Joseph Popp, a World Health Organization consultant and AIDS researcher, mailed 20,000
informational floppy disks containing ransomware to a group of international conference
attendees. The virus encrypted computer files and demanded that the victims send $189 to a
physical mailing address” (Pope 2016). Ransomware is malware (software that damages or allows
unauthorized access to computer systems) that creates a form of digital extortion for users that is
often delivered by a Trojan Horse (Heartfield and Loukas 2015). It usually requires a digital
payment to the extortionist after which the users are provided a key to unlock files that are
encrypted. There is also a strong financial reason to distribute ransomware. According to
SentinelOne, hackers behind a ransomware family called CryptXXX collected over $50,000 in
three weeks (Fenton 2016). The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) estimated that $209 million
in ransom payments were made in the first three months of 2016 (Fitzpatrick and Griffin 2016). It
continues today. On July 19, 2020, the computer servers at the College of Social and Behavioral
Science at the University of Utah were hacked, rendering them “temporarily inaccessible.” This
resulted in the university paying over $457,000 in ransom monies to the “unknown entity” who
attacked it (Pierce 2020).
The chances of a hacker being discovered, prosecuted, and penalized for conducting a
cyberattack are low due to several factors. First, many ransomware payments are relatively small
but distributed over many organizations, so the victim will often not report it. Second, the
payments are hard to track due to the use of crypto-currency. Lastly the companies are reluctant
to publicly admit that they were hacked. These factors result in the unintended consequence that
many groups, and even governments, effectively incentivize criminals to take the risk even for
relatively small amounts of money. The highly publicized WANNACRY ransomware shows the
potential for new sets of hackers to adopt this vector of attack. “As the WannaCry ransomware
epidemic wreaked havoc across the globe over the past three days, cybersecurity researchers and
victims alike have asked themselves what cybercriminal group would paralyze so many critical
systems for such relatively small profit. Some researchers are now starting to point to the first,
still-tenuous hint of a familiar suspect: North Korea” (Greenberg 2017).
In the last few years, ransomware has become sophisticated and malignant. According to
Best’s Review, “Ransomware tools are increasingly being used to cripple operations and spread
rapidly, resulting in the potential for massive business operations and property damage on a global
scale” (McNicolas and Cunningham 2017). Companies not only have to consider the cost of
building a firewall to protect against such threats and then respond to them if and when they occur,
but many firms are also now buying stand-alone insurance in the event they are attacked.
Some nation-states (e.g. North Korea) are beginning to take advantage of personal and
small accounts instead of focusing on power infrastructures, banks, and military organizations.
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This is becoming a training environment for novice hackers that are honing their skills to prove
their merit for their country. Small successes in hacking can provide confidence and experience
to move an individual from apprentice to master craftsman (cyber ninja). Foreign nation-states
have established training camps in their military organizations and are frequently seeking and
attacking foreign resources (Greenberg 2017).
Experienced and financed computer hackers are distributing ransomware for the purpose
of developing cash flow; in essence, they’re creating and running a business. Their well-defined
targets, via pretexting, use a form of “spear phishing” to accomplish their goals. They are
conducting business analysis to determine the viability of exploiting the discovered vulnerabilities
of potential targets and leveraging that vulnerability to their advantage. The developers of
ransomware also continue to develop and mature their attacks to expand the impact of the attack
and thus increase the likelihood of payment.
The primary industrial targets in the U.S. in 2015 were healthcare, manufacturing, financial
services, government, and transportation (Security 2016). These targets usually adopt a strategy
of maintaining a risk averse posture and having “deep pockets” to meet any ransom demands. This
is because most are required by law to maintain privacy of their client records. For example, a
ransomware breach of a healthcare provider’s computer system adds the risk of losing files that
are protected by the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability (HIPAA), which could result
in a federal fine and negative publicity. Under guidance released in July 2016, the Department of
Health and Human Services now presumes that a ransomware attack compromises electronic PHI
(public health information)—unless the HIPAA-covered entity can demonstrate otherwise
(McHale et.al. 2016). This provides further motivation for the healthcare provider to resolve the
issue quickly.
Regardless of the industry or company involved, ransomware is very lucrative as a business
model for cybercriminals/hackers. Datto’s 2016 survey showed that 42% of those small businesses
hit by ransomware paid, even though many of them did not get their data back (Hackman 2017).
Strategic Risk Management Options
The organization faces several options after a ransomware attack. NIST Special
Publication 800-39: Managing Information Security Risk (2011) defines four approaches to
managing risk. The organization may pursue acceptance, avoidance, mitigation, or transference
of risk.
ACCEPTANCE. There is a level of acceptable risk in any organization defined by the
culture of the organization. Acceptance is “taking your chances.” Acceptance is often the norm
for cyber protection as organizations do not define or execute a strong plan of response prior to a
malware attack. Acceptance (doing nothing) implies that there is a rationale for accepting certain
risks. Every organization faces multiple sources of risk in doing business, and therefore must
determine which risks require action and which to ignore, based on likelihood of occurrence and
impact on the firm. Some level of risk is acceptable. Risk posture, economic viability, and
corporate culture guides risk posture, as some organizations are risk averse (such as banking and
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finance) while others trend to exhibit a higher risk tolerance (often smaller businesses or
organizations that perceive they are not vulnerable).
AVOIDANCE. Avoiding the risk means to conduct business in a manner that there would
be no chance of being exposed to a cyberattack. This option is getting more difficult every year,
with more employees using their own hardware, working from home, and/or operating under “free
address” or variable work stations. Since this alternative would require either going out of
business, operating without electronic devices, selling the company and taking profits, or merging
with another firm that has extreme access to firewalls and protections, this alternative is not viable
for most companies.
MITIGATION. This means reducing the risk of exposure and loss. For example, the
organization may wish to attempt to reverse the encryption executed by the ransomware. The
measure of success with this approach may not be successful, however, since the strength of
encryption varies with the hacker. For example, it can range from elite encryption to “a poorly
executed simple symmetric key cypher to a complex RSA 4,096-bit encryption” (Liska and Gallo
2016). However, criminals make mistakes and sometimes the decryption key is stored in the
malware’s source code (apparent with the WANNACRY attack). Then the decryption might be a
less difficult matter, given time.
Several methods of mitigation are described at the end of this paper; however the strongest
response to ransomware is to back up all files often to multiple sites (on-site, off-site and cloud)
prior to the breach. It is important to avoid shared drives. These are encryption targets as well.
Unfortunately, it is time consuming to store backups in isolated, independent areas. Data backups
must be repeated often, with serious intent and testing to insure they are restorable and safe. The
backup methodology should be versioning, not incremental. This prevents malware-laden files
from over-writing clean files. It provides a safe return to point for the organization. However, it
is required that the backup version be on an isolated (not shared) storage device. The very
strongest risk mitigation tool is the education, training and creation of an employee awareness to
the ransomware threat.
TRANSFER THE RISK. Also called “shifting the risk,” the organization can transfer the
cost of the ransom and related expenses by purchasing insurance. The organization still gambles
that the ransom agents will provide a valid key to decrypt the files; however, the organizations act
under the comfort that any ransom expenses are reimbursable. The cost of insurance for future
events are dramatically higher without indications of enhanced protection of the cyber assets of
the organization. According to the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development,
the market for such insurance in 2016 was over $3.5 billion. With the new EU General Data
Protection Regulation taking effect in mid-2018, the worldwide market for cyber-insurance was
projected to reach $25 billion by 2020 (McNicholas and Cunningham 2017).
How It Works
As an obvious alternative, after the ransom payment (typically ranging from $300 to $1,000
per infected storage device, usually made in Bitcoin or another digital media), a key for the
encrypted device is provided. Note in Figure 1 (a screen capture of an infected machine), the
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ransom increases as time passes. This has become another social engineering technique,
depending on time as a factor to hasten a decision. In the ransom note below, the “monero” price
doubles very quickly. This decision is a business option incorporated into a disaster recovery
plan. It is important to plan for such an action before the incident to avoid a decision made in
panic mode under high stress.
The decision to pay the
ransom and receive the key for the
encrypted files is viewed as the
organization “doing nothing” to avoid
the situation (acceptance). The first or
“gut” reaction of many CEOs is an
emphatic NO to the payment of the
ransom. However, this illustrates the
advantage of having a strategic
disaster recovery plan in place prior to
the attack. Cooler heads need to
prevail in the time of a stressful
ransomware cyberattack. Often it is
Figure 1 - Star Trek Ransomware
advantageous to have a cybersecurity
firm hired as a management
consulting aid to help with strategy and decisions in preventing and responding to ransomware
attacks. Diebold Nixdorf used this tool effectively in dealing with the ATM problem in April 2020
(mentioned earlier), and paid no ransom (Kovacs 2020). It is important to recognize that there is
no guarantee that the criminals will provide a valid decryption key. Dave Packer is quoted as
saying “that a recent consumer survey found more than one in three ransomware victims ultimately
pay up, despite the fact that nearly half of the victims don't get their files back anyway”(Olenick
2017).
Using Bitcoin or other crypto-currency as payment makes the transaction anonymous and
very difficult to trace. Further, the FBI shows little interest in pursuing thefts or ransoms under
six digits. Local law enforcement can make a report. However, it would be rare that they would
have the resources to pursue the criminals. Most of the reports reviewed indicated the ransom key
was delivered and effective upon payment. There is a problem with trusting these reports since
many organizations are unwilling to admit that they made a payment without receiving a valid key
in return. Since the payment is made to an anonymous entity, there is no advantage to the hacker
to “build their reputation” by doing the honorable thing. Interestingly, it has become prudent for
a cyber thief to provide a real key to the organization to decrypt the files once the ransom is
received. There are reports of cyber criminals retaliating against fellow ransomware hackers when
they failed to provide a valid decryption key. This may indicate a developing culture of “honor
among thieves.”
Finally, one major defense is strong and current technology. However, this is not enough,
by itself, to assure safety from cyber threats. All three dimensions of the Maconachy, Schou,
Raggsdale (MSR) model of countermeasures must be employed to effectively reduce an
organization’s vulnerability to cyberattacks. Threats and vulnerabilities are morphing rapidly, and
most organizations exist in an open environment. Threats continue to grow from neophytes
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(operating under the umbrella of Ransomware as a Service – RaaS) to experienced and deeplyfinanced hackers. Further, some risk is internal, not external. For example, improper employee
behavior on computer systems actually causes a majority of all cybersecurity violations (Kon
2017).
This perplexes traditional law enforcement in their efforts to pursue and apprehend the
criminals. The traditional thought of “follow the money” to find the perpetrator is confounded by
the use of payment via Bitcoin, which is anonymous. In addition, these funds often buy a variety
of untraceable products like drugs, prostitutes, or other illegal activities.
Strategic Notes
As a final note for an organization’s consideration, there could be reporting requirements.
A health care organization could have to file a Health Insurance Portability and Accountability
Act (HIPAA) compliance report. An educational institution may be required to file a compliance
report under the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA). Other organizations may
be legally obligated to respond to the law described under Sarbanes Oxley (SOX) or Gramm-Leach
Bliley Act (GLBA). Although the encrypted files are still on the storage devices, they are under
the control of the
ransom agents, not
the organization.
Tim Rains of
Microsoft suggests
that corporate
management needs to
examine the risk
associated with the
threat
category
(Rains 2016).
To
build a well-informed
“risk statement,” he
suggests looking at
risk as a combination
of probability and
impact. The
Figure 2 - Developing A Risk Statement (from Microsoft)
evaluators (strategic
planners) should first
determine what assets are in need of protection. Different organizations will identify different
assets of different values to protect. For example, is the organization interested in protecting data,
reputation, or trade secrets and patents? The threat under consideration is a ransomware attack
(although organizations must consider all attacks). As the group looks at the issue of
vulnerabilities, the critical attack vector is usually the human element via a Trojan Horse.
However, there are other considerations, as well, such as unpatched infrastructure and the schedule
and methodology of backing up files. Finally, how is the risk mitigated or eliminated? The flow
chart in Figure 2 above illustrates the systematic process to constructing an effective risk statement.
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ANALYSIS OF SURVEY OF IT PROFESSIONALS
The authors administered a twenty-five-question survey to cybersecurity professionals (see
Appendix 1). The response rate was 35% (ninety-two respondents). The results indicate the need
for additional training and education. Ninety one percent of the participants were from IT
departments in education, followed by government and business. Many of those in education had
come from the private sector. Interestingly, ten of the participants experienced a successful
ransomware attack. The respondents were aware that the principal attack vector was to healthcare
providers. A follow-up question (question ten) indicated that although they recognized healthcare
as a target, 38% did not realize that a successful ransomware attack at a healthcare provider creates
a HIPAA violation. As mentioned previously, this enhances the potential loss to the organization
as it is now possibly subject to Health and Human Services (HHS) fines, penalties, and reports on
top of the costs to restore files and the possible payment of a ransom.
There is some variation as to perceptions about just what ransomware actually is. Question
two asked whether ransomware was a virus, social engineering, a worm, or a Trojan Horse.
Responses showed that most (37%) thought it was a virus, while 31% percent thought it was social
engineering and 20% a Trojan Horse. The remainder believed it to be a worm.
Question six asked the respondents about what threats their employers were emphasizing
in their organizations. Ransomware led the list with 42%, followed by hacktivists (30%), industrial
espionage (16%), and cyber war (11%). Since ransomware has become so prevalent, it is good
that employers are giving it more attention than previously.
Question twelve asked about what elements made an organization most vulnerable to an
attack by cyber criminals. Correctly, 97% indicated that the “human element” was the weakest
link, followed by software (2%), storage devices (1%), and routers (0%). Having this
understanding is critical for organizations, in that providing training and practices (such as clean
desk policies) can minimize the risk of such an attack.
Questions fourteen and fifteen were scenario-type questions. The scenario was, “You are
the System Administrator for a hospital, with a risk averse culture, and you have twenty-five drives
encrypted. A ransomware screen is demanding payment of $300 per computer. It will take $7000
of labor to restore the backup files with no guarantees that the backups are not infected. The
hackers provided a key to decrypt one computer as a show that their key will function. Which of
the following would you implement?” Responses ranged from “contacting local law enforcement
and the FBI” (79%) to “pay the ransom before the cost increases” (11%), “attempt to restore the
files from backups, then decrypt, then pay ransom” (5%), and “attempt to decrypt the files, then
attempt to restore the files, then pay ransom” (4%). It is interesting that the first impulse is to
contact law enforcement, even though the chances of them actually catching the perpetrators and
getting the money back is very remote. Again, this illustrates the need to have a plan in place to
deal with cyberattacks BEFORE the incident occurs.
The participants strongly agreed in answering a question dealing with encryption of files
to thwart a ransomware attack. They were nearly unanimous that the weakest link of the
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information system in a ransomware attack is the human element. However, it is disappointing
that half of those surveyed did not include in their disaster recovery plan (DRP) any guidance or
training to deal with ransomware. When a successful ransomware attack occurs, it is past the time
to call a planning meeting. Decisions made under stress can lead to greater expense and further
problems. The individuals distributing ransomware are conducting the attacks as a business.
Likewise, organizations must conduct a financial analysis to outline steps to guide their actions.
The plan must include options and alternatives depending on the status of the attack. As a business
decision, the individuals experiencing the attack must realize that the ransom usually goes up in
price daily if they delay or are unsuccessful in decrypting the files. These alternatives should
include:
•

Guidance as to whether or not to pay the ransom and the timing of the action. This
would include how the organization would use a crypto currency to make the
payment. A decision tree of steps and options will guide employees during this
issue. A comprehensive cost benefit analysis is required to address the needs of the
organization depending on the multiple scenarios of damage to the organization’s
system.

•

Coordination with information technology (IT) employees to attempt to decrypt the
files and find the point of entry for the hackers. The concept of encryption
techniques may require additional training. However, there are very good massive
open online courses (MOOCs) available to provide guidance. As other hackers
adopt the ransomware methodology, some are intentionally including the
decryption key in the source code so they have the ability to decrypt the files.

•

As laws and organizational vulnerabilities change over time, the guidance for
contacting law enforcement requires review.

•

The reporting implications of a business requires evaluation and definition ahead
of time. Is the healthcare organization subject to the requirements of Health and
Human Services under HIPAA requirements? Have Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX)
requirements for business organizations been met? If this is an educational
institution, does the college or university meet the Department of Education
guidelines for protection of data under the Family Educational Rights and Privacy
Act (FERPA)? Credit card organizations are subject to the laws of Payment Card
Industry (PCI) regulations. Other industries have similar laws and regulations.

This list demands a review and modification annually as the environment changes.
Crosstab Analysis of Selected Questions
An investigation via crosstab analysis compared responses based upon whether the
individual experienced a successful ransomware attack versus those that did not experience a
successful attack. We compared those two groups with respect to responses for questions fourteen,
fifteen, sixteen, nineteen, twenty-three, twenty-four, and twenty-five.
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Question fourteen states: “You are system administration for a hospital (risk averse culture)
and you have twenty-five computers encrypted. A ransomware screen is demanding payment
($300/computer); which single option would you follow? It will take $7,000 of labor to restore
the backup files, with no guarantees that the backups are not infected. The hackers provided a key
to decrypt one computer to show that they can indeed restore the data they stole.” The following
table displays the responses into true and false experiences with a ransomware attack.
Table 1: Ransomware payment choices
RESPONSE TO Q14
COUNT
Pay the ransom before the cost increases
10
Attempt to restore the files from backups, then decrypt,
5
then pay the ransom
Attempt to decrypt the files, then attempt to restore the
4
files, then pay the ransom
Contact local law enforcement as well the FBI
73

PERCENT
12%
5%
4%
79%

Only ten individuals responded that they experienced a ransomware attack. Of the ten
respondents, 80% indicated that they would contact the FBI while 22% said they would pay the
ransom immediately. Those that did not experience a successful ransomware attack also
predominately indicated they would contact the FBI.
Question Fifteen states: “Given the same disaster scenario, you are system administrator
for a hospital (risk averse culture) and you have twenty-five drives encrypted. A ransomware
screen is demanding payment ($300/computer); which single option would you follow? It will
take $7,000 of labor to restore the backup files, and no guarantees the backups are not infected.
The hackers provided a key to decrypt one computer as a show that their key functions. Which of
the following steps (a. b, c or d) would you implement?”
Table 2: Ransomware payment scenarios
RESPONSE TO Q15
COUNT
Call FBI, contact local law enforcement, attempt to
78
decrypt the files, restore the files from backup, pay the
ransom.
Attempt to decrypt the files, restore the files from
3
backup, pay the ransom
Attempt to restore the files from backup, pay ransom
0
Pay the ransom
8

PERCENT
88%
3%
0%
9%

Both groups liked the choice of the multi-step option of contacting the FBI first, then local
law enforcement, followed by restoration steps.
Question sixteen dealt with the payment for ransomware. Both groups recognized that
Bitcoin was the preferred method of payment as shown below:
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RESPONSE TO Q16
PayPal
Digital coin (Bitcoin)
Western Union
iTunes card

Table 3: Payment vectors
COUNT
3
85
4
0

PERCENT
3%
93%
4%
0%

Question nineteen dealt with inclusion of a ransomware strategy (in case of a ransomware
attack) in the organization’s disaster recovery plan (DRP). This question shows a descriptive
difference between the two groups (attacked by ransomware and not). Whereas 70% of the
attacked respondents had a plan that included ransomware considerations, only 47% of the notattacked group included ransomware in their DRP (Table 4). The respondents not attacked with
ransomware responded equally on their inclusion of a DRP response to ransomware or not:
RESPONSE TO Q19
TRUE
FALSE

Table 4: Inclusion in DRP

COUNT
42
45

PERCENT
47%
53%

Question twenty-three deals with the issue of whether the inclusion of a clean desk policy
should be adopted in every organization. Surprisingly, although virtually all experts and cyberthreat groups encourage organizations to adopt this policy to reduce espionage and cyber theft, it
seems to be perceived as less important, as neither group showed a strong policy orientation on
this issue, as shown below in Table 5:
RESPONSE TO Q23
TRUE
FALSE

Table 5: Clean Desk Policy

COUNT
20%
80%

PERCENT
29%
71%

Questions twenty-four and twenty-five are not ransomware-focused questions. Question
twenty-four shows that very few respondents use a short password, which is a desirable quality in
any organization. In addition, approximately 80% are using passwords between eight and eighteen
characters (Table 6). It is interesting that 70% (true) and 58% (false) utilize passwords longer than
twelve characters.
Table 6: Password Length
RESPONSE TO Q24 (# of characters in an important
COUNT
password)
1-7
1
8-12
37
13-18
41

PERCENT
1%
40%
45%
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>19

13

14%

Responses to questions twenty-four and twenty-five (see Table 7) indicate two things: First,
a lack of knowledge that special (cryptic) characters are not a deterrent to hackers. Second, that
password length is one of the most critical factors in preventing hacking behavior. A contributing
factor to this perception is system administrators that require special characters for passwords,
thereby forcing users to include special characters. The inclusion of special characters does not
make it more difficult for a hacker to access private files of an organization, especially when using
a program like Aircracker or Crowbar (not to mention more sophisticated hacking programs).
Raising awareness of administrators, managers, and users on the importance of emphasizing the
length for a secure password is a critical issue.
RESPONSE TO Q25
True
False

Table 7: Inclusion of Special Characters
COUNT
84
7

PERCENT
92%
8%

Crosstab Summary
The crosstab analysis of questions fourteen, fifteen, and sixteen revealed little difference
between the two groups in their attitudes toward ransomware responses. Although not a focus of
this survey, one author’s personal interactions with FBI agents indicates that organizations are
hesitant to contact the FBI after cyberattacks. The strong response to inform law enforcement may
be an academic response (this is what we theoretically do) rather than an industry response (this is
what happens in the real world). We note parallels to organizations not reporting security breaches
to a lack of industry filings to the SEC, although such reporting is required.
There appears to be a difference in these two sets for questions nineteen, twenty-three, and
twenty-five. These questions do not compare ransomware issues specifically, but just general
security issues. In question nineteen, the largest group of respondents (not having experienced a
ransomware attack), were split evenly on whether they included a response to a ransomware attack
in their DRP. It appears that too many organizations are not planning for a very-likely event (a
successful ransomware attack). In addition, question twenty-three shows a disturbing lack of
inclusion of a clean desk policy in their organization. A clean desk at the end of a workday is a
strong security policy to adopt in any organization to combat espionage and cyber theft.
Finally, question twenty-five indicates a need to raise the awareness of system
administrators, managers, and users to the importance of password length over the use of cryptic
special characters. The computer is not confused with the inclusion of special characters since
cracking a password involves all characters equally, whether numeric, alphabet, or special
character. Further, adding special characters makes it more difficult for human users to adopt the
policy and remember their passwords. A simple acronym is just as powerful. For example, using
a password like “mfmotyi06” is easily remembered as “my favorite month of the year is June.”
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We suggest that all organizations adopt a clean desk policy to minimize desktop theft of
valuable data, both during and after work hours. In addition, it is important to remove the
misguided policy of special characters in a password and replace it with the use of long passwords
and the adoption of passphrases. These last two techniques assist in creating a strong password
environment. The organization may also wish to raise the awareness of its users of the advantages
of a password manager and/or the use of a vault to store multiple passwords instead of using the
same password for all protected resources.
STRATEGIC OPTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Potential strategic actions to reduce the effect of ransomware include:
1) Educate employees with innovative educational techniques that include hands-on activities
rather than just a list of do’s and don’ts. It is important to act and raise the awareness of
employees as well as provide training in security methods. There needs to be random,
unannounced drills and teaching tests of employees using ransomware techniques. This would
include a well-developed feedback scenario to provide confirmation of the results of each
ransomware vector in the organization. A memorandum of understanding between the chief
executive officer (CEO) and the systems administrator needs to be defined to identify
expectations and actions to be taken during the drills and teaching tests.
2) Backing up data is a principle action to employ prior to the breach. See the previous
discussion that requires infrastructure security actions. This includes the use of version control,
not just incremental backups.
3) Users should run their computer in a user mode, not supervisor or administrator mode.
This will prevent some programs from running on a user’s computer without their
acknowledgement.
4) Autorun should be disabled for media (see above).
5) Top management establishes risk mitigation methodologies as a corporate responsibility.
End users implement these methodologies in a top-down approach.
6) The review of the disaster recovery plan (DRP) is an annual event. This DRP guides
actions when the breach occurs. DRP guidelines are proactive, not reactive. This DRP
includes defined actions to deal with the effects of ransomware attacks.
7) The organization should restrict or definitely scan all email attachments for malware (a
primary vehicle for the attack). This is a control issue for the systems administrator in charge
of email. This may require a group policy object (GPO) to block older versions of Microsoft
products (Word, Excel, PowerPoint) that permit the macro programming language. Newer
versions of Word files include a docx extension to indicate this file does not allow macro
programming. It is up to the organization to determine what actions will be permissible for
Adobe Flash on the user’s computer.
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8) Honeyfiles (a honeypot of files) can lure the attacker into a controlled area. When the
systems administrator notes (via an automated hash table review) encrypted files, the system
administrator can quickly stop the encryption chain from proceeding further. Another option
is to create a honey-directory that can keep the ransomware busy until the administrators can
take corrective action.
9) Patching of discovered infrastructure vulnerabilities require patches in real-time, along
with regular updating of software. The lack of patching on a regular basis is an issue that still
plagues organizations. System administrators should be required to do this regularly and
thoroughly to remove as much “tech-debt” as possible.
10) Perform penetration (pen) tests of the system, such as an IT audit of the organization, can
assist management in understanding any vulnerabilities “One of the more important things
internal audit can do is to assure that there’s a common understanding as to what the risk
appetite and risk culture are” (Jackson 2016). An experienced systems analyst should conduct
the audit.
11) Insist on long passwords for all access control and avoid the requirement of cryptic
passwords. Cryptic codes are difficult to remember but not difficult for a computer to crack.
Over 90% of the cybersecurity professionals included cryptic symbols (*,&,~) in their most
robust passwords even though password length is more important than inclusion of cryptic
symbols to thwart hackers. This may be a requirement of the computer program they use that
demands the use of cryptic symbols.
12) A technology and policy requirement that will not stop ransomware is encryption. The
ransomware will merely encrypt your encryption making those files unreadable without a
purchase of a key. While it is a good security policy to encrypt sensitive files, this will not
stop the effects of a ransomware attack.
13) Establishing a clean desk environment and locking of computers whenever the user is not
present will not stop ransomware. However, it sets a tone for computer usage in the
organization. It is important for the organization to foster a strong security posture.
CONCLUSION

It is recognized that one study cannot be sufficient to recognize and solve all IT security
issues for many different industries. This paper was designed to establish the size and scope of
the problem, assess the attitudes and opinions of IT professionals, and make general
recommendations to protect organizations from cyber threats in the future. The authors encourage
other scholars to investigate the specific needs for each industry in the areas of hardware, software,
training, and policy initiatives.
Ransomware is a dramatic threat to the economic and cultural vibrancy of any organization.
As companies operate in open systems subjected to multiple stimuli, management must be
proactive in strategic planning for cyber threats. Company users continue to open new
vulnerabilities by adopting new technologies in an Internet of Things (IoT). A business continuity
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plan with special attention to disaster recovery planning (including ransomware) must be a
requirement for all organizations.
Top management creates the posture of a disaster recovery plan. The implementation of
the plan is the job of security professionals in the organization. This is a necessary action since
top management and security professionals are more aware of the consequences of their decisions
when establishing a disaster recovery plan. They must select from one of four risk management
methods: acceptance, avoidance, mitigation, or transference of risk. Each method has inherent
advantages and disadvantages. The risk posture of the organization is a strong driver in the
decision of any recovery effort. Advanced planning is critical to avoid hasty or poorly formulated
decisions on mitigation methods.
Information threats have always been present. Industrial espionage has been in existence since the
earliest times of commercial activity. However, technology enables attackers to access data on an
unprecedented scale, opening new vulnerabilities for the threat actors to attack and leverage.
Attackers have found new vectors to take advantage of the network-centric society in which we
live. While some people advise to avoid payment in any illegal action, the problem is now
international in scope, with some of the biggest threats coming from less developed countries. We
must address layers of complexity in the risk management equation for our increasingly connected
and digitalized world.
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APPENDIX

Ransomware Survey Results (N and %)
Note: not all respondents answered all questions
N

%

84
6
2
0

91
7
2
0

32
27
10
17

37
31
12
20

3. Have you ever experienced a successful ransomware attack?
A) True (yes)
10
B) False (no)
79

11
89

4. The first occurrence of ransomware was:
A) 1980s
B) 1990s
C) 2000s
D) 2010s

25
14
23
27

28
16
26
30

9
0
4

10
0
4

1.

Which term best describes your profession?
A) Education
B) Government
C) Business
D) Other

2. Ransomware is best described as:
A) Virus
B) Social Engineering
C) Worm
D) Trojan Horse

5. The principle target of ransomware in 2016 is:
A) Government
B) Transportation
C) Manufacturing
D) Healthcare

76

85

6. By your estimate, which threat receives more emphasis in your organization?
A) Ransomware
37
42
B) Espionage
14
16
C) Hacktivists
27
30
D) Cyber War
10
11
7. Ransomware:
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A)
B)
C)
D)

Encrypts files on a local computer
Encrypts on comp. & mapped drives
Deletes attached files
Locks the computer

28
57
0
7

30
62
0
8

8. Ransomware is most likely to attack risk averse organizations.
A) True
32
B) False
58

36
64

9. A successful ransomware attack renders your computer unusable.
A) True
52
B) False
40

57
43

10. A successful ransomware attack on a healthcare provider can create a HIPPA violation.
A) True
55
63
B) False
33
38
11. There are threecountermeasures available to combat ransomware. The most vulnerable
element/s that permits ransomware is/are:
A) Human element
89
97
B) Routers
0
0
C) Storage devices
1
1
D) Software
2
2
12. Encrypting your files will thwart the effects of ransomware.
A) True
14
B) False
78

15
85

13. If you pay the ransom demanded in a timely fashion, you will receive a
valid decryption key.
A) True
39
B) False
52

43
57

14. You are the System Administrator for a hospital, with a risk averse culture, and you have
twenty-five drives encrypted. A ransomware screen is demanding payment of $300 per
computer. It will take $7000 of labor to restore the backup files, with no guarantees the
backups are not infected. The hackers provided a key to decrypt one computer as a show
that their key will function. Which of the following would you implement?
A) Pay the ransom before the cost increases
10
11
B) Attempt to restore the files from backups,
5
5
then decrypt, then pay ransom
C) Attempt to decrypt the files, then attempt

4

4
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to restore the files, then pay ransom
D) Contact local law enforcement and FBI

73

79

78

88

3

3

0
8

0
9

16. Ransomware payment is usually paid via:
A) PayPal
B) Digital coin (Bitcoin)
C) Western Union
D) iTunes card

3
85
4
0

3
92
4
0

17. Ransomware can:
A) Encrypt files
B) Steal passwords
C) Search and steal digital certificates
D) All of the choices

47
0
0
44

52
0
0
48

15. Given the same disaster scenario as in Q14,
A) Call the FBI, contact local law enforcement,
attempt to decrypt the files, restore files
B) Attempt to decrypt files, restore the files from
backup, pay the ransom
C) Try to restore files from backup, pay ransom
D) Pay the ransom

18. If you choose to attempt to decrypt affected files,
it is worth it to:
A) Search the malware code for a key
15
B) Go to the Netherland’s law enforcement site at
https://www.nomoreransom.org.
3
C) Begin with transposition options and build
10
from there
D) Both A and B
58

17
3
12
67

19. Does your organization have a disaster recovery
plan that includes what to do when ransomware
is successful?
A) True (yes)
B) False (no)

42
45

48
52

20. When dealing with ransomware, which is the
backup system of choice?
A) Incremental
B) Versioning

37
45

43
52
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C) No answer

5

5

21. Historically, if you fall victim to a ransomware
attack and pay the ransom, you will not be
attacked again.
A) True
B) False

7
84

8
92

22. Do you use Windows Volume Shadow Copy
Service (VSS) in your organization?
A) True (yes)
B) False (no)

19
59

24
76

23. Do you have a clean desk policy at work?
A) True (yes)
B) False (no)

25
63

28
72

24. How many characters are in your most
important password?
A) 1-7
B) 8-12
C) 13-18
D) 19+

1
37
41
13

1
40
45
14

25. Do you include special characters (*,&, #)
in your most important password?
A) True (yes)
B) False (no)

84
7

92
8
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